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This week, I had the opportunity to attend an Army human dimension workshop. We spent two days discussing what some groups are doing to improve human performance today; what the future of war might look like; and discussing, in breakout groups, the soldier of 2050, what s/he will look like, and what it will take to recruit that soldier.
Part of the discussion in my group included the following points: that a lot of the work will be done by robots (whether a true robot or some other use of automation), not soldiers, allowing us to reduce the number of soldiers needed – or, perhaps, simply changing how they are distributed; that the brain’s of children and young adults today look different than they did 20 years ago, due to changes in school curricula (reducing the amount of memorizing required, reducing the amount of time spent in physical activity) and lifestyle (no need to memorize, for instance, a phone number, if you have it saved in your phone); and that distance education and virtual reality are likely to play an increasing role in education at all levels, effecting interpersonal skills.
But the more I thought about these assumptions, the more they bothered me.
We are talking about soldiers who, for the most part, have not yet been born. The enlistee of 2050 will not be born for another 15 years; the Army Chief of Staff of 2050 may be a student in the Basic Officer Leadership Course today. There is a lot of time between now and then to effect change if we, as an Army and/or as a country, want things to change.
Rather than accepting these assumptions, it seems to me that we should, yes, consider trends in warfighting technology, but also in education and other relevant areas, and determine which trends we want to effect. And then take the next 35 years doing so.
For example: children today spend less time outside being physical today than they did 30 years ago. That trend is expected to continue. Besides basic physical fitness, exercise, especially outside, results in increased bone density, both from the activity and from being in the sun, absorbing vitamin D. The downward trend of exercise (and drinking milk, another major source of vitamin D), is already effecting recruiting, as demonstrated by increased obesity, bone breakages in boot camp, etc. By 2050, this problem is expected to be significantly worse, increasing the difficulty in recruiting healthy soldiers; this problem will cross the other services and also first responders of all types. What can be done to reverse that? For example, can the Army work through the Executive Branch directly to develop programs in the Department of Education to emphasize physical education in school? Does Congress need to be involved either directing the work, or funding it?
When we talk about recruiting in 2050, we are talking about individuals who are post-Generation Z.* Sociologists still don’t have a full grasp of Gen Z characteristics – in part because they are still teenagers and younger. Though we can make assumptions, based on past generations and future trends, as to what the future recruit will look like, don’t even have a name yet for the generation we’re discussing. So, rather than assume our hands tied by what might be, how can we, as the human dimension community, can help ensure we have the recruits we need? Ultimately, because the Army thinks about the future in a way most industry does not, we are in a position to help the country as a whole be healthier 30 years from now because we are thinking about these things.
The Army used to be a leader in technology. We’ve lost a lot of that edge. Because of the rate that companies can work in the private sector now, undeterred by layers of bureaucracy, we are unlikely to regain that leadership position. But the Army can take the reigns in working toward a healthier US population. Now, wouldn’t that be something.
* Generation Z refers approximately to individuals born in the 2000s-2020.
Generation Y/Millenials are generally those born between 1980-1999.
Generation X are those born post-Baby Boom, pre-Millenial: 1965-1979.
Baby Boomers are those born between 1946-1964.
This week, New America hosted a forum entitled “The Future of War”. The speakers included the Service Chiefs from the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, and the Air Force’s Vice Chief was on one of the panels. Add in panels representing academia, media, technology, and retired flag officers who aren’t afraid to speak their minds, and some short discussions about human enhancement and cyber (cyber rifle, anyone?), and it was an impressive, thought-provoking line up.
GEN Milley, in a conversation with Barbara Starr, talked a lot about acquisition and the (desperate, IMO,) need for acquisition reform. Many of his comments centered around the acquisition of a new pistol: a proven technology that is readily available at Cabelas. After many years, and hundred of pages (just in the requirements document – the rest of the documents would easily get the page count into the thousands, I’m sure), the top contenders are now undergoing a two-year, $16M test. To say the approach is slow would be an understatement, and GEN Milley does not even try to hide his frustration about that.
Presumably because the acquisition is so slow, and he knows what is in the pipeline, GEN Milley mentioned that he does not see any fundamental changes coming to the Army for the next 5-10 years. Beyond that, yes, but not in the next 5-10 years.
I have a number of concerns about this, as should anyone reading this. First, our primary adversaries (Russia and China) have not spent the past 15 years at war; while we have been depleting ours, they have spent that time beefing up their own arsenals.
But more importantly, to me, is that it assumes that fundamental change can only come through materiel. What about the human dimension? It is significantly faster and less expensive (though also significantly harder, due to necessary culture changes) to strengthen the human capital of the Army – the soldiers – both physically and mentally than it is to buy a new piece of gear.
Simply focusing on the Performance Triad in a meaningful way – making sure all soldiers get sufficient amounts and quality of sleep; good, healthy, nutritious food; and daily exercise – will increase readiness, reduce injuries, and increase performance. Eight solid hours of sleep at night. Eating right. Exercising daily – preferably in the afternoon, as that has been shown to increase the likelihood that soldiers will get the sleep they need in the morning. At no added cost to the Army. Going farther, there are techniques to improve training – physical and mental – thereby improving the capabilities of each soldier. Add in more physical monitoring – which many soldiers do on their own anyway – whether through a FitBit or any of the other commercial applications, and Army leadership can be proactive in maintaining the health and readiness of the force.
Near-term improvements – even fundamental changes – are possible, and will result in a stronger, more prepared Army. But they require changes to the Army’s culture.
On second thought, acquisition reform might be easier.
It will come as no surprise to anyone who even remotely follows the goings-on within the Defense Department that DoD and the Services all have a bit (or more than a bit) of a crush on Silicon Valley. In fact, it may be more than a crush: sometimes, it seems to border on obsession.
And why wouldn’t it? DoD used to be the leader in innovation; now, it can’t even remotely keep up. A 10+ year development and acquisition cycle versus Moore’s Law In Action (the observation that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years – it is actually closer to 18 months now). Silicon Valley gets its pick of the top recruits from the top schools every year. Getting a job at Google is more competitive than getting accepted to HARVARD. Silicon Valley and “innovation” seem to be the buzzwords of the year at the Pentagon.
So I want you to imagine the following scene: Dean Kamen, inventor of many, many things, including the Segway, standing in front of an auditorium full of (mostly) Marines. This group has gathered for a meeting entitled Marine Corps Force Development 25 (FD25), and was meant to introduce more innovation into the process. Mr. Kamen was one of the keynotes, and kept the entire audience enthralled for his full allocated time – and then continued for another hour beyond that.
His company, Deka Research, is fairly small (about 500 employees). When large companies want to be innovative, they either bring him in to help “teach” them to be innovative (which he does not really think is possible in a large organization), or (more often), they hire him to do the innovative thinking/product development. He can do this: he is the sole owner of his company, and other than keeping employees paid, he has no obligations to outside parties. The company is not publicly traded, it has no shareholders, etc. And failure certainly does not come with a risk of “death”.
His bottom line: the military should not try to be innovative (as a whole). There is too much at risk. Slow, meticulous, planned, consistent. These words mean death in Silicon Valley; but for members of the military, they provide the best chance of long-term survival. There may be places for innovation within the services, but trying to emulate Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs is both impossible and impractical. And just plain not a good idea.
As the Army (and DoD) continues to focus on Silicon Valley, I hope they heed the words of one of the most prolific innovators and inventors of the past 50 years: proceed with caution, and do not risk lives in an attempt to be more like “them” on the West Coast.
Every year I try to go to at least one totally new meeting. One where I am unlikely to see another Beltway Bandit. One not run by AUSA, or NDIA, or the Army itself.
In 2013, one of those meetings was the first conference held by the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (DEF) in Chicago. DEF is the brainchild of some then-junior officers, representing all 4 services, who were frustrated by the lack of innovation in their organizations. They came together to brainstorm ideas to different Big Problems. From a single weekend-long event, DEF has expanded to include an active social media presence, day long conferences in different locations called DEF[x]s, and recurring (often monthly) local meetings called DEF Agoras, in addition to our annual (fall) national meeting.
This past weekend was the DEF[x]William & Mary. Held at the Mason School of Business, about 80 people – a combination of military (no uniforms allowed), industry, and students – spent the day taking on some Big Problems. The topic of the day was the Third Offset, but with breakout sessions on Force of the Future, the Human Offset, and Civilian Perspectives as options, and Ori Brafman as a keynote speaker, I was looking forward to a day of thinking about the Human Dimension.
Ori started the day as you would expect him to (if you’ve ever heard him speak to a military audience, anyway). There was a lot about the Spider and the Starfish, and resilient organizations. But then he started talking about the military-civilian divide. Now, that’s not an unusual topic, but it did set the tone, at least for me, for the rest of the day.
In Force of the Future, we wound up in break out groups. Each group formed to discuss military recruiting. My group – consisting of 4 active duty officers, 2 students, and myself – focused on college students with STEM degrees. Our task was to develop a profile of what a typical person of this description would look like, so we could figure out how to recruit that person. (Two other groups were talking about retaining drone pilots and mid-career accessions of in-demand specialties like cyber.)
We named our recruit Jill Stephanopoulos – mostly to make everyone write the name “Stephanopoulos”. She’s 20 years old, from Virginia, and a mechanical engineering student at W&M (as it turns out, W&M does not have a mechanical engineering department). Why would Jill want to join the military when she had so many other options?
At this point, the group turned to our two college student members. Why would YOU join the Army? Well, the answer was: they wouldn’t.
This was a little shocking to the usually-uniformed members of our group.
But not to me. I’ve had this conversation too many times in the past year to find it at all surprising.
Less than 1% of the US population serves in the military. Less than 7% of the US population has ever served in the military – and that includes veterans from the draft era. What most people in this country know about the military is what they see on television and in movies. Between Wounded Warrior commercials (IMO, possibly the worst thing for the military recruiting top talent); news stories about PTSD, TBI, homelessness among veterans, and the issues with the Veterans Administration; and movies and television shows including all-too-regular stories about soldiers suffering from PTSD, the average American does not have a favorable impression of the military. Not because of the military itself, but because of the results of serving. They just don’t hear – and therefore don’t know – the positive stories.
Both student members of the group agreed that this is, in fact, a big part of their impression.
No wonder it’s difficult to recruit. Not only does the military pay less than engineering firms, for example, but choosing the military, in their minds, is choosing psychological or neurological damage (or both). And not being able to get help. Not a lot of 22 year olds are going to sign up for that, not when they have so many other options.
This discussion continued at lunch, though with a different group – a DoD civilian, an Army officer who is currently in school full time, an Army general officer, two different students (one majoring in Arabic, the other minoring it), and myself.
Until yesterday, the two students didn’t know you could go into the Army and not start in the infantry or armor. They knew about Defense Language Institute, but thought you had to go into the Army and “do Army stuff” first. What changed?
They met actual members of the military and had conversations with them. They heard about the wide variety of jobs the different individuals had. They learned that the military is more than uniforms, and saluting, and guns, and violence. They experienced the passion. They witnessed the pride for the job. And, yes, they also heard the frustrations, but tempered with an understanding that we all choose to continue to do this work. Because of that passion and pride.
The military wants the top students. To get them, they have to acknowledge the civilian-military divide, they have to fix the public impression of the military, and they have to educate civilians on what it really means to be in the military. This requires regular interaction with the public – not just public affairs officers, and not going where contractors will be. It means going out and talking with students – not just to recruit them. It means having actual conversations and exchange of ideas. It will not be easy. And it won’t always seem like ‘the juice is worth the squeeze’.
But recruiting the best not only means being the best, it means making sure everyone else knows you’re the best.
Next week’s post with either be about Data Analytics, Google, Amazon, and Army Recruiting or USMC Force Development 25.
Coming in May 2016: DEF[x]DC, hosted at Georgetown University.
Every October, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) holds a conference. It is quite the event. Especially if you like looking at the Big Toys being sold to the Army. The Washington DC Convention Center is filled to the brim with tanks and helicopters and everything else you can think of.
Besides the various materiel, and social events, and athletic events (Army 10 Miler anyone?), there are also Professional Development Opportunities, full of panels on different Army-centric topics, and always with an impressive lineup of speakers. This past year, for the first time, I attended one of the Family Forums.
The panel included Secretary McHugh, just a few weeks before his retirement, GEN Milley, and SMA Dailey. The focus of the panel was Taking Care of Soldiers and Their Families. If you take care of your people, they’ll take care of the mission.
Very few 17-24 year old Americans are eligible to join the military, even using fairly low standards. Obesity and academic performance (graduating from high school and obtaining a minimum score on the ASVAB) are two of the key reasons.
But even once they’re in the Army, many young people do not succeed in boot camp and in their initial years in the Army. I’ve heard that 1/3 of recruits do not complete their initial term. That’s a huge number.
SMA Dailey opined that part of the reason for so many issues in boot camp is that recruits enter the Army having never failed at anything before. Their parents, school systems, even athletic organizations (participation trophies anyone?) protected them so much that many fail for the first time in boot camp. Here’s the thing: boot camp is designed so that everyone will fail. How can they build you up if you they don’t break you down first? (Also, there’s that thing about the enemy not caring if they hurt your feelings.)
So everyone fails at boot camp. Hopefully, everyone also recovers from that failure. That’s what resilience is all about. But many recruits, having had no experience in recovering, don’t know how.
Since October, I’ve been thinking a lot about resilience. Has our society become less resilient? Is the amount of PTSD more “proof” that soldiers today are weaker than soldiers of WWII? Or has it just become more acceptable to admit your weaknesses? Or, maybe, it’s both.
My contention is that there are two forms of non-resilience:
A baby is born and, assuming all else is equal, will hit certain milestones within standard windows. A baby who tries to stand and falls down will, generally, try again. Some will take longer. Some will get frustrated. But they will (again, with all standard caveats), eventually, walk. But as children age, far too often, parents step in and help the child. So the child stops learning how to pick himself up and try again. This is learned non-resilience.
On the other hand, some children – some people – are just softer. They do not have the emotional reserves to try again. This could be because they never had them. This could be because they’ve already reached their emotional limits and have nothing else to give (either until they heal, or ever, depending on the depth of their scars). This is natural non-resilience.
It is pretty important for the Army to distinguish between these groups. But simply conducting resilience tests may not provide the necessary data. As I said: these distinctions are MY idea, and they are totally untested, and I’m unqualified, in a have-the-professional-background-to-prove-it kind of way, to know whether both groups would test the same way.
But I do know this: WMC (see last week’s post) has been correlated with resilience. Because it is not a direct test of resilience, I believe that it will show the individual’s ability to learn to be resilient.
If we know that the person can be resilient, boot camp becomes the perfect place to teach them. Preferably without breaking them.
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